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1. Introduction
“Member states’ expected loyalty in implementing EU
policy appears not to be sufficient,” opined the European
Parliament in 2011, adding: “If solidarity is needed, then
Union action may be required” (European Parliament,
2011). These words foreshadowed what was to come
soon. Until the start of the war in Ukraine, 2015 wit‐
nessed the highest influx of people seeking protection
in Europe since the end of World War II. In 2016,
European Commission President Jean‐Claude Juncker
observed that:
At the end of 2015, the EU could look back on a
year when European solidarity withstood what may
have been the greatest trials it has faced since the
end of World War II. European solidarity will pre‐
vail in 2016 as well, so long as member states’ lead‐
ers follow through on meeting their commitments.
(Juncker, 2016)
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This was, at best, a rather charitable depiction of devel‐
opments in the European Union.
2015 no doubt presented very serious logistical and
governance challenges for receiving countries as well as
the EU as a whole. Individuals attempting to reach the
EU, while not a recent phenomenon, demanded urgent
policy responses. Opinions differed on the best course
of action, underscoring difficulties that plague EU‐wide
governance of migration, especially during times of mul‐
tiple crises. In addition to Brexit, the financial, and
the so‐called refugee crises, governance was addition‐
ally rendered difficult with the rise of populism, which
fanned the flames of domestic anti‐immigration senti‐
ments and percolated up to the European level. Later, the
pandemic would further add to these woes. Building on
the literature on European migration governance, work
on populist right‐wing parties, and juxtaposing the suc‐
cess of the EU–Turkey deal, the nonuse of the Temporary
Protection Directive (TPD), and the demise of the tem‐
porary relocation scheme using process tracing meth‐
ods, this article begins to explore the 2015–2016 episode
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as a recasting of solidarity, putatively a principle of the
EU’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice and therefore
also of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
It weaves together two concurrent stories with Germany
at the center. The first is the domestic politics of the sum‐
mer of 2015 and its aftermath in Germany, a country
that received a significant portion of the arrivals. The sec‐
ond is the EU’s failed solidarity‐based response, despite
Germany’s leadership efforts, especially when it came
to sharing risk and responsibility. The article thus seeks
to connect the national and European levels and does
so against the backdrop of the EU’s CEAS, now in its
third phase and an example of defensive integration in
Europe. The German and EU cases solidly point to a sol‐
idarity deficit: Internally, risk and responsibility are dis‐
tributed unevenly and inequitably across EU member
states; externally, efforts center on avoiding or limiting
exposure and therefore responsibility. The domestic and
regional rise of populism recasts solidarity and shifts it
towards exclusion.
2. The Common European Asylum System as Defensive
Integration
The birth and governance difficulties in EU’s CEAS is
well‐documented in the literature. Established in 1999 to
formulate common standards between member states
in receiving and processing asylum seekers and their
claims (Comte, 2020; Lott, 2022; Paoli, 2016; Uçarer,
2022), CEAS legislation crystallized around the Asylum
Procedures Directive determining the procedural rules
governing asylum applications, the Reception Conditions
Directive setting standards on the living conditions of
asylum seekers upon arrival, the Qualification Directive
defining who can lay claim to refugee status, the
Dublin Regulation allocating member state responsibil‐
ity for processing an asylum claim, and the EURODAC
Regulation assisting the Dublin Regulation by setting up
a fingerprinting system, also resulting in the launching
of the European Asylum Support Office to support the
implementation of CEAS in member states. The first wave
of CEAS instruments was adopted between 2003–2005,
and the second wave, in 2010–2013, delivered revisions
to existing documents. CEAS currently finds itself in its
(stalled) third phase (Guild, 2021).
The CEAS portfolio has typically yielded lowest com‐
mon denominator instruments because decisions ini‐
tially needed unanimity. Unanimity afforded a veto for
each member state, and the decision‐making environ‐
ment constrained the European Commission and the
European Parliament (Uçarer, 2022). Even after the
EU moved towards the Ordinary Legislative Procedure
and normalized the role of the Commission and the
Parliament after the Amsterdam Treaty, policy output
maintained the defensive and restrictive tenor of ear‐
lier days (Ripoll Servent & Trauner, 2014). As the EU
expanded to Central and Eastern Europe, these new
members also started playing a role in buttressing restric‐
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tive trends. Consequently, whereas the EU’s rhetoric pro‐
claimed its commitment to the protection of human
rights, the right to seek asylum included, its institutional
setup favored restictionist policy outcomes (Lavenex,
2018). Furthermore, while the EU legislation was cal‐
ibrated to limit access to EU territory, the protection
of the asylum seekers’ human rights was largely del‐
egated to member states whose implementation poli‐
cies, despite minimum thresholds imagined by the EU,
remained disparate. The second phase of the CEAS
reflects the continuation of this defensive core rather
than rethinking exclusionary measures through the lens
of human rights (Trauner & Lavenex, 2015).
The third phase of the CEAS was stalled between
2013 and 2016. In 2016, with the 2015 crisis provid‐
ing an opportunity to restart negotiations, the European
Commission proposed a package of six pieces of leg‐
islation to reform the CEAS. In 2017, the European
Parliament and the Council reached a broad agreement
on all but two of these instruments: the reform of the
Dublin system and the Asylum Procedure Regulation.
The Dublin system to assign responsibility for asylum
applications needs revision because it distorts responsi‐
bility towards members at the external borders of the EU.
As such, it is an instrument that fundamentally under‐
mines solidarity with frontline states, as evident in the
2015 episode. That the EU members continue to be
stalled on its rehabilitation is telling.
In short, the 2015 events were not a significant cata‐
lyst for change for the CEAS, instead underscoring frag‐
mentation between member states, reintroducing bor‐
der controls, and aiming to pass the buck. The crisis
did not end EU cooperation in the CEAS, but brought
on an episode of “defensive integration” (Kriesi et al.,
2021, p. 331): Member states engaged simultaneously
in internal re‐bordering (through temporarily suspend‐
ing Schengen) and external re‐bordering by attempting
to shore up external borders (Schimmelfennig, 2021), for
example through a robust European border and coast
guard. The CEAS thus has a policy heritage that has pro‐
duced minimum protection standards, if that, for the
EU (Niemann & Zaun, 2018), and its inability to ade‐
quately address the 2015 fallout points to ongoing ten‐
dencies hardened by newer challenges, dissonant with
EU’s stated commitment to solidarity.
3. The European Union and the Quest for Inclusive
Solidarity
Solidarity, though not new nor explicitly defined, is
one of the EU’s foundational principles, reflected in
the preamble to the 1951 European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty. At its core, solidarity is a willing‐
ness to share risk and responsibility. In most contexts,
it also requires acceptance and support of the “other”
(Kymlicka, 2015), especially in times of need. Both the
EU and its member states are large and differentiated
societies relying on robust systems of division of labor
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and mutual dependence, and therefore emblematic of
a shift from Durkheim’s mechanical to organic solidar‐
ity. Banting and Kymlicka (2017, pp. 4–5) identify three
types of solidarity: civic solidarity (tolerance and absence
of prejudice), democratic solidarity (support for equal‐
ity, human rights, due process, and the rule of law), and
redistributive solidarity (transfer of resources towards
the poor and vulnerable). The internal solidarity towards
(fellow) member states envisioned by the EU aspires to
all three and applies to a community conceived broadly
as a group of states with shared goals and commitments.
Practical applications of solidarity are therefore the basis
of redistributive EU policies in social and regional pol‐
icy which assist poorer members from EU coffers. While
redistributive solidarity typically involves financial and
material support, in the field of refugees and asylum
seekers, it can additionally require redistributive reloca‐
tion of people from areas that are highly impacted by
influx to areas of lower density. The literature gener‐
ally considers redistributive solidarity to be more chal‐
lenging than civic or democratic solidarity (Banting &
Kymlicka, 2017).
Article 80 of the 2007 Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union envisions “solidarity and fair
sharing of responsibility including its financial implica‐
tions, between the member states” (European Union,
2012). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
has repeatedly affirmed (internal) solidarity “based on
mutual trust between the member states, as a general
principle inferred from the nature of the Communities
and the principle of loyal cooperation between the
EC institutions and the member states” (European
Parliament, 2011, p. 6). In addition to the trust and loy‐
alty referenced here, Goldner Lang (2013) adds fairness
towards the over‐burdened and necessity to ensure sta‐
bility in the EU as relevant markers. The EU frequently
linked solidarity to responsibility during the refugee cri‐
sis, calling for managing the refuge challenge “by work‐
ing together, in a spirit of solidarity and responsibil‐
ity” (European Council, 2015a). There is, however, less
agreement on whether solidarity extends to the reloca‐
tion of people (European Parliament, 2011, pp. 31–36).
Inclusive internal solidarity is implicit in the EU and imag‐
ined to extend to all members.
EU’s commitments under international law also have
an external element beyond the EU as they obligate
recipient states to process asylum applications regard‐
less of origin, thus extending human rights protections
to those in flight. The global regime also expects soli‐
darity through burden‐sharing with countries experienc‐
ing large influxes. The refugee regime therefore also
hinges on external solidarity with third countries as
well as persons seeking protection, “others” from a
national or EU standpoint. The EU is embedded in this
system of external obligations to solidarity. The 2015
episode highlights shortfalls in both internal and exter‐
nal dimensions.
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4. Populist Right‐Wing Radical Parties and Exclusive
Solidarity
Populism, on the rise in Europe since the 1990s, stands in
stark contrast to inclusive and global solidarity. Populists
juxtapose the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite,
privileging “the will of the people” (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2016). While there are exam‐
ples of populism on the left, it manifests mostly on
the right. Crises provide fertile ground for its activa‐
tion. Typically, these parties are nativist, maintaining
that “nonnative elements (persons or ideas) are funda‐
mentally threatening to the homogeneous nation‐state”
(Rooduijn, 2018). In addition to expansively imagining
the “other,” and therefore leaning exclusionary, they
also tend to be authoritarian, anti‐pluralist, frequently
Eurosceptic, lay exclusive claim to representing “the peo‐
ple,” and consider all others to be illegitimate outsiders
(Müller, 2016). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013)
show the prevalence of exclusionary populism in Europe
in material (exclusion from resources), political (exclu‐
sion from participation), and symbolic ways.
Populist right‐wing radical (PRR) parties mobilize and
leverage immigration as a wedge and nativism as a strat‐
egy for electoral success (Dostal, 2017; Ivarsflaten, 2008,
p. 14; Mudde, 2017). Nativism goes hand in hand with
what Triandafyllidou (2020, p. 801) terms “neo‐tribal
nationalism” premised on a rejection of “diversity from
within or from outside” and is thus closed and exclu‐
sionary. These stances have political and policy conse‐
quences, resulting in welfare chauvinism and activating,
as Schmidt and Spies (2014, p. 521) observe, “natives’
racial prejudices to undermine redistributive policies” to
preserve welfare benefits for “legitimate” citizens, all ele‐
ments of material exclusion (see also Kymlicka, 2015;
Marx & Naumann, 2018). Since EU rules offer a variety
of protections for European citizens as quasi‐insiders in
member states, welfare chauvinism is most successfully
directed at non‐European “others” (such as refugees or
non‐Christians) and is a proxy for opposition to redis‐
tributive solidarity at the EU level. Cultural protectionism,
a defense of the national community against “ ‘intruders’
both from within (immigrants) and outside (suprana‐
tional political institutions such as the European Union
or the United Nations)” is also prevalent (Oesch, 2008).
Nativism, whether presenting as welfare chauvinism or
cultural protectionism, thus limits the “us” and expands
the “other” and, while it insists on solidarity, such sol‐
idarity is narrow, highly exclusionary, and meant for
the in‐group.
The so‐called refugee crisis contributed to a marked
increase in welfare chauvinistic attitudes which, at least
in the case of Germany, was present among supporters
of all parties, though not of the same intensity (Marx &
Naumann, 2018). PRR parties and their calls for mate‐
rial and political exclusion of the “other” cause political
ripples beyond elections by forcing shifts in mainstream
parties’ immigration stances when they seek to preserve
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votes by accommodating the populist right (Kymlicka,
2015; van Spanje, 2010) allowing them to influence pol‐
icy from outside the government (Kallis, 2018, p. 67;
König, 2017). PRRs, therefore, present migration gover‐
nance with challenges both domestically and (directly
or indirectly) in the EU, especially during times of crisis.
The exclusionary thrust of PRR populism thus manifests
itself as exclusionary solidarity at the national level and,
from there, also threatens—or at least complicates—
inclusive solidarity at the European level. Informed by
this literature, what follows is a discussion of the failure
of solidarity‐inspired governance efforts in Europe, illus‐
trated by how the domestic politics of populism might
have militated against inclusive solidarity at both the
national and European level, further enabling the defen‐
sive integration strategies of sealing off external borders
while reinstituting internal ones. Germany’s attempts
to lead Europe out of the 2015 crisis, and where it
failed and succeeded, provide an initial glimpse into
these dynamics.
5. Between Alternative für Deutschland and a Hard
Place: The Solidarity of German Right‐Wing Populism
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) was founded in 2013
by Eurosceptic economists and intellectuals disillusioned
by Germany’s center‐right, just six months before the fed‐
eral elections. It was a single‐issue party that strongly
rejected the Euro and the Eurozone bailout packages
(Franzmann, 2016; Schmitt‐Beck, 2017). Comprising also
nationalist conservatives, AfD first entered elections in
2013 when, while below the 5% necessary to gain seats
in the Bundestag, it garnered 4.7% of the national vote,
a remarkable showing for a first‐time party conjured at
the last minute. In just five years, it was chairing the
budget committee in the Bundestag. Within a year of its
launch, AfD also performed well in the 2014 European
Parliament elections and garnered 7.1% of the German
national share, securing seven of the 96 German seats.
Starting with the Landtag elections in 2014 (Saxony,
Brandenburg, Thuringia), it began entering state legisla‐
tures with 9.7–12.2% of the vote. 2015 saw it expand
into Western Germany with an even bigger electoral suc‐
cess after the summer of 2015, entering Saxony‐Anhalt,
Baden‐Wuerttemberg, and Rheinland‐Pfalz legislatures.
After an internal leadership change that saw the
nationalist and anti‐immigration wing prevail, Frauke
Petry, known for her anti‐Islamist views and her calls
for firing on people if necessary to prevent illegal bor‐
der crossings, took the reins and the party pivoted
sharply towards anti‐immigration, nativist and nation‐
alist rhetoric. Enjoying particular success in Eastern
Germany, AfD launched into a strident critique of Angela
Merkel’s emphasis on Germany’s Willkommenskultur
(“welcome culture”) through its Herbstoffensive 2015
(“fall offensive 2015”). The crisis framing was purposeful
as populists frequently need to maintain an air of per‐
manent (if manufactured) crisis to agitate (Müller, 2016).
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Dubbing the summer of 2015 as Asylchaos (“asylum
chaos”), AfD’s new leaders Petry and Jörg Meuthen
accused the government of inviting uncontrolled immi‐
gration and framing the issue as “the people’s will
vs. government/elite mismanagement” (Geiges, 2018;
Schmitt‐Beck, 2017).
AfD politicians clearly saw mobilization potential in
the events of the summer of 2015. Alexander Gauland,
a long‐time nationalist conservative CDU member of
the Bundestag who later became the co‐leader of
AfD, thought the influx and the government’s handling
thereof was “a gift” for AfD; Björn Höcke, leading the
right wing of the AfD, implored: “Asylum is a topic where
the AfD can and must score points now” (as cited in
Geiges, 2018, p. 52, author’s translation). The emergent
themes were uncontrolled mass migration causing a cri‐
sis and draining resources from citizens (Petry, as cited
in Geiges, 2018, p. 60, asked: “How social is Germany
really to its own citizens?”) and an emphasis on being
overrun at home and in the region (Petry, as cited in
Geiges, 2018, p. 57, said: “The simple fact is that neither
Germany nor other European countries have an unlim‐
ited capacity to receive”). She also clearly securitized the
issue: “In 2015, it seems completely unproblematic that
a million, maybe more, people migrate to Germany, peo‐
ple we don’t know and whose intentions in Germany are
unclear” (as cited in Geiges, 2018, p. 58). Speaking to
European ramifications, Höcke maintained that Europe
would suffer because of a “welcome party that got out
of hand” (as cited in Geiges, 2018, p. 58). AfD’s rallies
dubbed Chancellor Merkel the Weltflüchtlingskanzlerin
(“world refugee Chancellor”), allowing the AfD to lay
claim to the issue while mainstream parties were trying
hard not to politicize.
By this point, migration had become the single most
important issue for the German population during the
elections (Dostal, 2017) and AfD scored important elec‐
toral gains in the Landtag elections in 2016. In February
2016, CDU scrambled to contain the damage during the
federal election season, while positioning themselves
as the mainstream address for the national conserva‐
tive right (as opposed to the AfD), an attempt they
would repeat in 2018, with equally limited success. AfD’s
electoral success continued with the federal election of
2017, when it achieved 12.6% of the vote and became
the third‐largest party in the Bundestag and the main
opposition after the CDU/CSU/SPD coalition. Gauland
and the economist Alice Weidel who led the party at
the Bundestag, both displayed significant anti‐immigrant
tendencies: The former cast the refugee issue as a water‐
ing down of German identity, and the latter framed it
as an economic burden. Both positions are consistent
with situating solidarity with its “rightful” beneficiaries,
namely (a narrowly‐defined) German people. Both dis‐
play elements of material and political exclusion.
In January 2018, AfD’s first federal legislative pro‐
posal was an attempt at hindering family reunifica‐
tion (material exclusion) to avoid “the continued arrival
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of millions of relatives and the threat to the welfare
state, society, domestic peace, and constitutional order”
(Knight, 2018, emphasis added). In April 2018, AfD even
went to the Verfassungsgericht (German Constitutional
Court) with three complaints that the 2015 actions of
Chancellor Merkel’s government had infringed on the
rights of the Bundestag, as well as violated the sepa‐
ration of powers. While AfD’s complaints were unani‐
mously rejected by the Verfassungsgericht in December
2018, the move was a personal attack against Chancellor
Merkel and kept the “crisis” in the headlines by por‐
traying the German people as the victims of irresponsi‐
ble government/elite actions. Migrants themselves were
also not spared. In a recent parliamentary debate on
the budget, Weidel said: “Burkas, girls with headscarves,
men with knives, and other ne’er do wells will not secure
our prosperity, our economic growth and, above all, our
welfare state” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2018,
author’s translation, emphasis added). In both cases,
Germany and German people are depicted as the vic‐
tim, first at the hands of the migrant “other” and then
at the hands of the irresponsible government. Rösel
and Samartzidis (2018, p. 10) show that AfD succeeds
in places where the electorate already feels that gov‐
ernment policies do not demonstrate sufficient solidar‐
ity with the disenchanted voters. Recasting solidarity
as a responsibility towards only “deserving Germans” is
therefore both a response to this disenchantment and a
successful electoral strategy (Weiland, 2018).
This strategy continued to pay off in the Landtag
elections in Saxony and Brandenburg in September 2019,
where AfD garnered 27.5% and 23.5% of the vote respec‐
tively. In October 2019, it received 22% of the vote
in Thuringia, a state that was formerly run by a left
coalition. In the 2021 federal elections, AfD maintained
its strength in the east but suffered losses elsewhere
in Germany, possibly due to pandemic concerns out‐
weighing immigration. Domestically, it is plausible to
maintain that the ascendance of the populist stance
of the AfD has caused a shift in attitudes towards asy‐
lum seekers from mainstream parties. This is quite evi‐
dent in the coalition agreements between CDU and the
SPD, partners in the “grand coalitions” of 2013 and
2017. While the former agreement casts migration as
an opportunity, the latter (post‐2015 and post‐AfD) cau‐
tions that the carrying capacity of the country must not
be strained any further (Rasche, 2018). Public opinion
likewise swayed: In 2017, 56% of Germans supported a
quantitative limit for refugees living in Germany, and 26%
considered refugees to be Germany’s main foreign policy
issue (ahead of all issues polled; see Erlanger, 2017, p. 8).
AfD was clearly able to capitalize on the wedge issue
of migration and frame the German response as irre‐
sponsible inclusiveness that rendered the German peo‐
ple victims of elite largesse. It insisted that German loyal‐
ties should lie with Germans, not with dangerous others.
The souring of the initially welcoming public opinion also
helped. The November 15 Paris attacks, followed in short
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succession by the 2015 New Year’s Eve sexual violence in
Cologne and Hamburg and the 2016 Islamist terror attack
that targeted a Berlin Christmas market caused a signifi‐
cant shift in public opinion, played into AfD’s hands, and
reignited debates about German asylum policies (Dostal,
2017, p. 592). These developments almost resulted in
the collapse of the German government in 2018 and, if
nothing else, hastened the end of Chancellor Merkel’s
remarkable reign in German politics. In short, populist
politics by AfD and the mainstream efforts to retain votes
reframed solidarity towards narrower and exclusionary
ends both materially and in political terms.
6. The EU Level: Solidarity’s Unfulfilled Promise
Our gaze now shifts to the European level. The EU,
through CEAS, had been attempting to govern asylum
for several decades before 2015. Some instruments of
solidarity were already in place before the summer of
2015. Importantly, the TPD (2001/55/EC) was devised in
2001 as a response to the displacement from the dis‐
solution of Yugoslavia and was designed to respond to
situations of mass influx from third countries. Article 1
of the TPD lays out its dual purpose: providing protec‐
tion (for up to three years) to those fleeing conflict in
large numbers and doing so in a manner that displays
burden‐sharing among member states. It is therefore an
instrument that has potential for both external solidar‐
ity (with those fleeing) and internal solidarity (with mem‐
bers most affected). This solidarity would be inclusive
(influx from any origin would be considered) and could
assist countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Greece,
which bore the main brunt of the influx. It needed to be
activated by a qualified majority decision at the sugges‐
tion of the European Commission and the request of a
member state. Curiously, this instrument was never acti‐
vated, although Italy attempted, unsuccessfully, in 2011
in response to the increase in arrivals after the Arab
Spring (Gluns & Wessels, 2017). Given the disproportion‐
ate impact of this mass influx in Germany, it was the most
likely country to seek to activate this instrument in 2015.
But it didn’t.
This can be attributed to various factors. First, what
constitutes a mass influx is vague and it is unclear
whether the mass influx should be generally experienced
in Europe or in a particular country. Second, the TPD
does not have a system for redistributing the arrivals and
hinges on the willingness of both the receiving country
and the fleeing individual for relocation to occur, making
redistributive solidarity through relocation complicated.
Third, the deep divisions between member states on
how to respond and the relatively small perceived ben‐
efits would have prevented an affirmative vote. While
Germany could initially count on the support of its
coalition of the willing (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Portugal, France, and Greece),
this coalition became increasingly tenuous. Merkel even‐
tually even lost the firm support of Austria and France.
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The coalition of the unwilling, on the other hand,
included Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and the
UK (von Schmickler & Börnsen, 2016), making German
efforts risky in political terms. And finally, Germany
would incur significant financial costs to implement the
TPD if approved while receiving little in return from the
EU (Gluns & Wessels, 2017).
With this (relatively weak) solidarity instrument
untapped, Chancellor Merkel was forced to consider
other paths to stem the flow and address inequity.
Germany’s initial efforts were congruent with inclu‐
sive solidarity at home and in Europe. However, when
the dust settled, the policies that were adopted were
solidarity‐deficient. Internal inclusive solidarity within
the EU involves protections against racism and xenopho‐
bia and promotion of diversity in the civic realm, pro‐
tection of equality, due process, and access to courts in
the democratic realm, and welfare and social services for
protection seekers, and burden‐sharing and assistance
to member states in the redistributive realm. External
inclusive solidarity with those outside the EU involves
equal application of international law, nondiscrimina‐
tion based on national origin and religion, and resisting
deflective policies that restrict access. The EU could also
uphold human rights protections, and redistribute risk
and responsibility by supporting resettlement into its ter‐
ritory. EU’s efforts at external and redistributive solidar‐
ity in particular fell well short of this potential.
EU’s efforts to restrict and deflect asylum‐seeking
in its territory predate 2015 and is well‐documented
(Lavenex, 2018; Zaun, 2018) and have been attributed to
its dysfunctional institutional dynamics (Lehmann, 2018),
identity politics (Börzel & Risse, 2017), and power politics
between refugee receiving countries and others (Zaun,
2018). EU’s internal responsibility sharing resolve, not
particularly strong to begin with, contributed to the chal‐
lenges it is currently facing. In some ways, Schengen’s
asylum provisions, solidified with Dublin, were redistribu‐
tive mechanisms driven by the notion of responsibility
(nominally amounting to relocation) but unencumbered
by significant solidarity (Goldner Lang, 2013; Lott, 2022;
Paoli, 2016; Wagner et al., 2018).
In addition to the TPD discussed above, the EU
also has some internal redistributive solidarity instru‐
ments. Financial instruments, such as the European
Refugee Fund, seek to assist with financial burden‐
sharing (primarily for member states). Its redistributive
efforts to share people are much less robust and exac‐
erbate geographic vulnerabilities in perimeter countries.
Member states’ commitment to displaying external soli‐
darity has fared even worse, with the undesirable costs
of refugee protection typically driving political decisions.
These serious institutional shortcomings, coupled with a
weak will, and an unusually pronounced refugee influx
on the heels of the financial crisis hampered the EU’s
ability to respond effectively to the current crisis. Pleas
for solidarity, whether from Germany or EU institutions,
largely remained in the realm of the rhetorical.
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The events of 2015 laid bare the weaknesses of the
EU’s capacity to equitably manage this influx as well as
the limits of the promise of internal and external soli‐
darity. This period was marked by a sharp increase in
arrivals in Europe and their problematically uneven dis‐
tribution. Importantly, the percentage of asylum seekers
was very small compared to the EU population (0.22%)
but masked the variance between member states: while
Slovakia and Poland had 0% asylum seekers by percent‐
age of population, Germany had 0.69% (more than three
times the EU average), Austria had 0.97%, and Sweden
1.33% (roughly six times the EU average). Meanwhile,
the numbers of UNHCR’s populations of concern were
dramatically higher in other places closer to the Syrian
conflict: 3.77% for Turkey, 9.31% in Jordan, 12.61% for
Iraq, and 17.6% in Lebanon (data compiled from UNHCR,
2017). Such variance should have triggered both internal
and external solidarity mechanisms in CEAS. Instead, it
yielded ad hoc restrictive responses by many EU mem‐
bers, Chancellor Merkel’s calls notwithstanding, and
implementation of policies intended to pass on, rather
than share, responsibility to other states within and out‐
side the EU. Despite requests from frontline countries
such as Greece and Italy, no substantial internal solidarity
was forthcoming.
External solidarity with asylum seekers and non‐EU
states struggling with the developments was also in
short supply, leaving many highly exposed and vulnera‐
ble. Unlawful push‐backs and collective expulsions, espe‐
cially in Central and Eastern Europe, were coupled with
detention of arrivals, highly problematic under interna‐
tional law, and raising questions under the European
Convention on Human Rights (Amnesty International,
2015, p. 11). The internal mechanisms of assigning
responsibility for asylum seekers based mainly on point
of arrival (the Dublin system) was already dysfunctional
from a solidarity standpoint, placing undue burden on
perimeter member states, especially those in the geo‐
graphic vicinity of the flows. Dublin had been the tar‐
get of various legal challenges at the European Court
of Human Rights and the CJEU even before 2015. This
system had additional adverse consequences for the
receiving countries and asylum seekers, a dual failure in
internal and external solidarity. It was under these cir‐
cumstances that Germany, which was about to start feel‐
ing the impact of AfD’s ascent, attempted to lead the
EU towards a collective solution as AfD and its populist
agenda were also beginning to make inroads in the EU.
7. Germany’s Leadership and the Elusiveness of
Solidarity: The Temporary Relocation System and
the EU–Turkey Deal
In 2015, Germany needed to assert leadership, champi‐
oning two remaining paths. The first was to put in place
a mechanism at the EU level to relocate arrived asy‐
lum seekers who were distributed very unevenly. This,
the temporary EU relocation system, was an intra‐EU
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redistributive solidarity mechanism. The second, the EU
deal with Turkey, was not a solidarity instrument but
was rather designed to shift responsibility away from the
EU and its member states. Germany played a key role
in both schemes. Only the latter non‐solidarity scheme
was successful.
The temporary EU relocation system, a relatively
strong instrument of redistributive/material solidarity
proposed by the European Commission, was champi‐
oned by Germany. In two stages, the Commission rolled
out a plan to redistribute 160,000 persons throughout
the EU territory in an attempt at solidarity through shar‐
ing of people. The decision overrode opposition from
the V4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia). In December 2015, Hungary and Slovakia chal‐
lenged the decision by filing lawsuits with the CJEU to
annul this decision (https://curia.europa.eu). While the
CJEU ultimately found against them, their efforts to scup‐
per solidarity based on a permanent quota system was
ultimately successful (Kirchner, 2020). The temporary
relocation system actually produced very modest actual
transfers of people. By April 2017, only 16,340 of the ini‐
tial 160,000 were transferred, a tiny portion of the tar‐
get five months before it expired on 27 September 2017
(European Commission, 2017). The acceptance of relo‐
cated individuals also remained uneven, with Germany
and France taking the lead in absolute numbers and only
Malta and Finland meeting their quota. Hungary and
Poland did not participate, the Czech Republic did not
relocate anyone after May 2016 and Bulgaria, Croatia,
and Slovakia met only 2% of their relocation targets.
The fact that only 16,000 could be relocated in more than
18 months surely was not the high mark of internal soli‐
darity (ECRE, 2017).
Subsequent efforts focused on developing a perma‐
nent quota‐based system to redistribute persons. Italy
had been asking for “obligatory burden‐sharing” since
2009. Germany, which had its own federal quota mecha‐
nism, was also in favor but was unable to lead the EU on
this, sidelined by countries with strong populist politics
at home, including Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia. Negotiations at the EU level became mired in
further discord. The analysis of an anonymous EU offi‐
cial is apt: “Unless countries can escape their domes‐
tic political agendas, [the relocation system], which is
already wholly inadequate,” would fail (Henley, 2016).
Currently, the preference is for efforts at solidarity to
be on a voluntary basis as opposed to binding quo‐
tas, despite the obvious weaknesses of such a system.
At a December 2017 EU meeting, by which point AfD
had already become the main opposition party in the
Bundestag by vilifying her welcoming policies, Chancellor
Merkel insisted that “there can’t be selective solidarity”
only to be successfully rebuked by the V4 (Nielsen et al.,
2017). Redistributive solidarity thus remains elusive.
The EU–Turkey deal, by contrast, an exercise in
avoiding responsibility, was struck with remarkable ease.
In December 2013, Cecilia Malmström, then Home

Social Inclusion, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 36–47

Affairs Commissioner of the European Commission,
signed a readmission agreement with then Turkish Prime
Minister Davutoğlu. This agreement obligated Turkey
to readmit third‐country nationals entering the EU ille‐
gally while in transit through Turkey. In return, the EU
promised Turkey help in bolstering its borders and put
visa‐free travel for Turks on the table. At the time of
the agreement, there were already a significant num‐
ber of Syrian refugees in the country, roughly one mil‐
lion, but this would swell to three million in the next
three years. In April 2015, when some of these dis‐
placed persons started to enter EU territory, a special
European Council resolved to “step up cooperation
with Turkey” and also reinforced political cooperation
with Africa to tackle illegal migration, smuggling, and
trafficking (European Council, 2015b). In May 2015,
EU High Representative Mogherini, and Neighborhood
and Enlargement Commissioner Hahn met their counter‐
parts in Turkey. An EU press release read:
In particular, we focused on the migration chal‐
lenge, which has been brought so sharply into focus
by the recent tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea.
We agreed to ask our services to prepare a plan
to enhance our cooperation…on preventing illegal
migration flows. (European Commission, 2015)
After the summer of 2015, and the bruising domestic
political developments in Germany, Chancellor Merkel
finally brokered a deal with Turkey to stem the influx
In September 2015, an informal meeting of EU heads
of state resolved to reinforce dialogue with Turkey. In a
follow‐up meeting in October, the European Council
adopted a Joint Action Plan to stem the flow of refugees
(“European Union: EU–Turkey joint action,” 2015). Soon
thereafter, Chancellor Merkel visited Ankara, to shop
this deal, dubbed the Merkel Plan (European Stability
Initiative, 2015), and displayed a willingness to negoti‐
ate with Turkey despite its autocratic turn. She proposed
a new agreement. Individuals who arrived in Greece
without papers would be returned to Turkey. Turkey, in
turn, would receive aid to help with the costs associated
with the refugee influx. To sweeten the deal, visa‐free
travel for Turks was put on the table. In November 2015,
when the Turkey Refugee Facility designated EUR 3 bil‐
lion in assistance, European Council President Donald
Tusk acknowledged Turkey’s position as a transit country,
stressing the expected role of Turkey in stemming these
flows (Seufert, 2016). The 2015 negotiations yielded the
2016 EU–Turkey deal. The EU, and Germany in particular,
were increasingly vulnerable to a second record‐breaking
summer of arrivals in 2016 and needed this agreement,
despite the illiberal domestic behavior of their partner.
It looked like “the 28 EU heads of state forged the
March 18 deal with Turkey with their backs seemingly
against the wall, and in an atmosphere of palpable panic”
(Collett, 2016). This deal was highly effective in stem‐
ming the flows and externalizing responsibility. In the
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month after its conclusion, arrivals decreased by 90%
(“Number of migrants,” 2016). In early 2017, the EU pre‐
dicted a 98% reduction over the previous year (European
Council, 2017).
These two episodes, both led by a Germany reel‐
ing from the effects of the 2015 arrivals and its domes‐
tic politics, underscore the limits of solidarity in the EU
and the shortfalls of EU’s asylum governance embod‐
ied in CEAS. The difficulty of securing internal solidarity
through the relocation system, temporary or permanent,
stands in sharp contrast with the ease of engineering the
EU–Turkey deal, allowing the EU to eschew external sol‐
idarity. Interestingly, while the refugee influx subsided
thanks to the EU–Turkey deal, the populist politics sur‐
rounding it would persist and even consolidate at the
European level.
7.1. Populism at the European Level: Alternative für
Deutschland and the European Parliament Elections
Germany’s AfD is strongly Eurosceptic. This is reflected
in its party program, which calls for power to be restored
to nation‐states: It maintains that, with the Lisbon treaty,
“political elites have taken steps to permanently trans‐
form the EU into a centralised state” despite popu‐
lar opposition. Here, we encounter the popular will vs.
elite imposition argument once again (AfD, 2017, p. 16).
AfD also opposes the 2016 Global Compact for Migration,
an instrument that has elements of global solidarity,
arguing that, just like Germany’s, the EU’s migration poli‐
cies are misguided:
We also want to prevent the looming risk of social
and religious turmoil and the creeping extinction of

European cultures…we advocate the complete clo‐
sure of external EU borders….The AfD firmly opposes
the introduction of a solidarity tax for the benefit of
refugees. (AfD, 2017, pp. 58, 63)
It also maintains that “Africa cannot be saved in Europe”
(AfD, 2017). Here, AfD is rejecting solidarity internally
with fellow EU members, and externally with third coun‐
tries. The solidarity that AfD champions is exclusive and
boundedly national.
AfD campaigned for European Parliament elections
in 2019 along these lines and captured 11% of the vote
(up from 7.3% in 2014), still making hay of the by‐then
subsided refugee crisis. The AfD European Parliament
elections manifesto in 2019 calls for a return to a “Europe
of nations,” upholding of national sovereignty in asylum
and immigration policies, a complete rethinking of the
EU’s humanitarian programs, an end to regional burdens
for Germany, return migration instead of immigration,
securing borders, rollbacks on freedom of movement
privileges, “Dexit” if the EU did not undertake sufficient
reforms, and the ironic call for the abolishing of the
European Parliament. AfD maintained that the EU’s cur‐
rent course on immigration and asylum, pushed by the
EU elite, would “put European civilization in existential
danger….All migration to Europe should be limited and
guided in such a way that the identity and culture of
European nations would be preserved under all circum‐
stances” (AfD, 2019a, p. 37, author’s translation). Its elec‐
tion posters reflected this position (see Figure 1). There
are clear elements of material exclusion in these calls,
but also the potential of political exclusion (excluding
Germany from the EU and also excluding migrants from
decision making).

Figure 1. AfD European Parliament election posters, May 2019. Text on the left reads: “Can you manage Brussels? Secure
the borders!” (photo by the author). Text on the right reads: “One thing is certain [sicher, “safe”]: It’s not the border! Out
of love for Germany. Freedom, not Brussels” (AfD, 2019b).
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In this, AfD counted on support from—and actively
campaigned with—its European partners in Italy
(Salvini’s Lega Nord) and Austria (Strache’s belea‐
guered Austrian Freedom Party [FPÖ]) and beyond
(“AfD demands,” 2019). In fact, in April 2019, AfD’s
Spitzenkandidat Meuthen, sitting next to Salvini, the
Danish People’s Party and a representative of the pop‐
ulist Finns, endorsed the campaign slogan “Towards
a Common Sense Europe! Peoples Rise Up” (“Matteo
Salvini tries to unite Europe’s nationalists,” 2019). Just
five days ahead of the European Parliament elections,
additional leaders of the main Euroskeptic populist par‐
ties (Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom and Marine
Le Pen of France’s National Rally) attended a rally in
Milan where organizer Salvini proclaimed: “Here you
won’t find the far‐right, but the politics of good sense.
The extremists are those who have governed Europe for
the past 20 years” (Kirby, 2019). Populist parties did well
in the 2019 European Parliament elections, but perhaps
not as well as they would have hoped. Nonetheless, the
contagion hypothesis tells us that PRR parties do not
need to be in power to have weight.
Pushback at the EU level can partially be traced
to domestic developments in Germany. After the 2015
Cologne attacks attributed to men of non‐European ori‐
gin, the Slovakian Prime Minister Fico, supported by
the Czech prime minister, called the EU to an emer‐
gency summit, chiding his colleagues for trivializing “the
security risks associated with unregulated and uncon‐
trolled migration within the EU….We don’t want some‐
thing like what happened in Germany taking place in
Slovakia” (“After Cologne,” 2016). These developments
have buoyed AfD and xenophobic tendencies in the pop‐
ulace, also allowing populist elements in other countries
to point to Germany as an example of what to avoid.
AfD’s rise thus had domestic and EU consequences, espe‐
cially when considered in the broader context of PRR
developments in other EU member states.
8. Conclusion
What are the prospects for the future of the CEAS
and what role can rising populism play in the gover‐
nance of immigration and asylum in the EU? Reviewing
the so‐called refugee crisis from the vantage point of
Germany starts to give us some clues. As an EU mem‐
ber state receiving a disproportionate number of asylum
seekers and embodying a series of rather serious logis‐
tical and political challenges, Germany, and in particu‐
lar Chancellor Merkel, had a moral, political, and legal
base and incentive for evoking EU‐wide solidarity (Zaun,
2018). A long‐time driver of the European integration
project, it also had, at least in theory, the requisite power
with which to wield leadership and influence. There were
significant constraints for this, however.
At the domestic level, anti‐immigrant sentiment
mobilized by the AfD precipitated strains within
Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democrats, and created
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incentives for centrist parties to track to the right to stop
bleeding votes to AfD. Meanwhile, AfD pivoted its party
platform towards a nativist stance, used migration as a
wedge issue, and reframed solidarity in narrow and exclu‐
sionary terms, both domestically and during the EP elec‐
tions. The politicization of the issue forced Merkel away
from Germany’s initial liberal position and left her vul‐
nerable to attack from AfD and others. At the European
level, Germany’s pleas for EU‐wide solidarity within the
EU remained unfulfilled as several member states, most
loudly in Central and Eastern Europe, balked at the inter‐
nal solidarity targeted by redistribution within the EU.
Squeezed at home from both her own party and facing
AfD contagion, Chancellor Merkel was unable to move
the solidarity needle at the European level. It is hard to
disagree with Bulmer (2018, p. 21), who observes that
the domestic struggles in Germany “displayed how elec‐
toral concerns about the AfD…can have ramifications all
the way up to the European Council, weakening Merkel’s
negotiating position.” The 2015 episode thus demon‐
strates a failure of both inclusive internal solidarity and,
to an even larger extent, external and global solidarity.
In Germany, AfD was able to redefine solidarity in nar‐
rower nativist and nationalist terms and cause political
shifts to the right through contagion effects.
At the EU level, the internal redistributive solidarity
logic of the relocation plan was rejected in favor of an
approach that would instead externalize responsibility to
third parties. Meanwhile, populist politics and exclusion‐
ary approaches in material and political terms are now
embedded in national politics and the EU through the
Council and the Parliament. The CEAS thus carries for‐
ward the restrictionist tendencies of European integra‐
tion in asylum matters. Its various reforms are stalled
and have not bucked this trend. The 2015 episode clearly
points to current developments as defensive integra‐
tion. The Commission’s September 2020 New Pact for
Migration and Asylum attempts to break the stalemate
but fundamentally retains approaches that rely on exter‐
nalization, deterrence, containment, and return, point‐
ing to continuity rather than change. Meanwhile, EU’s
response to the 2022 influx occasioned by the war in
Ukraine is markedly different from the 2015 episode.
Since the onset of the Russian invasion on 24 February
2022, over 6.5 million have fled to neighboring coun‐
tries as of June 2022, with more than 7 million displaced
internally. The vast majority of these individuals are in
Poland (1,143.000), Germany (780,000), Czech Republic
(360,000), Italy (125,000), Spain (109,500), Romania
(85,000), Slovakia (80,000), and a number of other EU
members in smaller numbers (UNHCR, 2022).These are
numbers that exceed the 2015 influx. Unlike the 2015
episode, over 90% of these are women and children.
And, unlike in 2015, the EU triggered, for the first time
ever, the TPD unanimously on 4 March 2022, a mere ten
days after the Russian invasion. TPD provides residence
permits and access to the labor market in the EU for
Ukrainians and third country citizens residing in Ukraine,
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conditions more generous than was available in 2015.
The activation of the TPD moves the needle towards
internal and external material solidarity if not also provid‐
ing a potential for redistributive solidarity. Interestingly,
populist politics are alive and well in a number of coun‐
tries most affected by arrivals and yet there is no compa‐
rable populist resistance. It appears that Ukrainians are
not othered in Central and Eastern European countries
and elsewhere as the 2015 arrivals were. This puzzle calls
for further research and attention.
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